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Abstract
We consider the problem of aggregating votes cast by a society on
a fixed set of issues, where each member of the society may vote for
one of several positions on each issue, but the combination of votes on
the various issues is restricted to a set of feasible voting patterns. We
require the aggregation to be supportive, i.e. for every issue j the cor-
responding component fj of every aggregator on every issue should sat-
isfy fj(x1, , . . . , xn) ∈ {x1, , . . . , xn}. We prove that, in such a set-up,
non-dictatorial aggregation of votes in a society of some size is possible
if and only if either non-dictatorial aggregation is possible in a society
of only two members or a ternary aggregator exists that either on ev-
ery issue j is a majority operation, i.e. the corresponding component
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Science Department of UC Santa Cruz and was partially by the European Union (European
Social Fund ESF) and Greek national funds through the Operational Program “Education
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satisfies fj(x, x, y) = fj(x, y, x) = fj(y, x, x) = x,∀x, y, or on every is-
sue is a minority operation, i.e. the corresponding component satisfies
fj(x, x, y) = fj(x, y, x) = fj(y, x, x) = y,∀x, y. We then introduce a no-
tion of uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator, which is defined to be an
aggregator that on every issue, and when restricted to an arbitrary two-
element subset of the votes for that issue, differs from all projection func-
tions. We first give a characterization of sets of feasible voting patterns
that admit a uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator. Then making use of
Bulatov’s dichotomy theorem for conservative constraint satisfaction prob-
lems, we connect social choice theory with combinatorial complexity by
proving that if a set of feasible voting patterns X has a uniformly non-
dictatorial aggregator of some arity then the multi-sorted conservative
constraint satisfaction problem on X, in the sense introduced by Bulatov
and Jeavons, with each issue representing a sort, is tractable; otherwise it
is NP-complete.
1 Introduction
Kenneth Arrow initiated the theory of aggregation by establishing his celebrated
General Possibility Theorem (also known as Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem) [1],
which asserts that it is impossible, even in easy cases, to aggregate in a non-
trivial (non-dictatorial) way the preferences of a society. Wilson [16] introduced
aggregation on general attributes, rather than just preferences, and proved Ar-
row’s result in this context. Later on, Dokow and Holzman [8] adopted a frame-
work similar to Wilson’s in which the voters have a binary position on a number
of issues, and an individual voter’s feasible position patterns are restricted to
lie in a domain X . Dokow and Holzman discovered a necessary and sufficient
condition for X to have a non-dictatorial aggregation that involves a property
called total blockedness, which was originally introduced in [10]. Roughly speak-
ing, a domain X is totally blocked if “any position on any issue can be deduced
from any position on any issue” (the precise definition is given in Section 4 of
the present paper). In other words, total blockedness is a property that refers
to the propagation of individuals’ positions from one issue to another.
After this, Dokow and Holzman [9] extended their earlier work by allowing
the positions to be non-Boolean (non-binary). By extending total blockedness to
the non-Boolean framework, they gave a sufficient condition for the possibility of
non-dictatorial aggregation; moreover, they gave a weaker necessary condition,
which however may not be sufficient.
Recently, Szegedy and Xu [14] discovered necessary and sufficient conditions
for non-dictatorial aggregation. Quite remarkably, their approach relates aggre-
gation theory with universal algebra, specifically with the structure of the space
of polymorphisms, that is, functions under which a relation is closed. It should
be noted that properties of polymorphisms have been successfully used towards
the delineation of the boundary between tractability and intractability for the
Constraint Satisfaction Problem (for an overview, see, e.g., [6]).
Szegedy and Xu [14] distinguished the supportive (conservative, in the ter-
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minology of complexity theory) case (studied by Dokow and Holzman in [9]),
where the social position must be equal to the position of at least one individ-
ual, from the idempotent (Paretian) case, where the social position may not
agree with any individual position, unless the individuals are unanimous. In
the idempotent case, they gave a necessary and sufficient condition for possi-
bility of non-dictatorial aggregation that involves no propagation criterion like
total blockedness, but only refers to the possibility of non-trivial aggregation
for societies of a fixed cardinality (as large as the space of positions). In the
supportive case, however, their necessary and sufficient conditions still involve
the notion of a total blockedness.
Here, we follow Szegedy and Xu’s idea of deploying the algebraic “toolkit”
[14] and we prove that, in the supportive case, non-dictatorial aggregation is
possible for all societies of some cardinality if and only if non-dictatorial ag-
gregation is possible in a society of just two members, or a ternary aggregator
exists that either on every issue j is a majority operation, i.e. the corresponding
component fj satisfies
fj(x, x, y) = fj(x, y, x) = fj(y, x, x) = x, ∀x, y,
or on every issue is a minority operation, i.e. the corresponding component
satisfies
fj(x, x, y) = fj(x, y, x) = fj(y, x, x) = y, ∀x, y.
For the notions of majority and minority operations see Szendrei [15, p. 24].
Also, in Section 4 we characterize total blockedness not as a property of
propagation of individual positions but simply as a weak form of impossibility
domain (no binary non-dictatorial aggregator).
In the sequel (Section 5), we introduce the notion of uniformly non-dictatorial
aggregator, which is defined to be an aggregator that on every issue, and when
restricted to an arbitrary two-element subset of the votes for that issue, differs
from all projection functions. We first give a characterization of sets of feasible
voting patterns that admit uniformly non-dictatorial aggregators. Then mak-
ing use of Bulatov’s dichotomy theorem for conservative Constraint Satisfaction
Problems (CSP’s), see [2–4], we connect social choice theory with combina-
torial complexity by proving that if a set of feasible voting patterns X has a
uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity then the multi-sorted conser-
vative constraint satisfaction problem on X , in the sense introduced by Bulatov
and Jeavons [5], with each issue representing a sort, is tractable; otherwise it is
NP-complete.
2 Preliminaries and Summary of Results
2.1 Basic Concepts
In all that follows, we have a fixed set I = {1, , . . . ,m} of issues. Let A =
{A1, . . . , Am} be a family of finite sets, each of cardinality at least 2, representing
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the possible positions (voting options) on the issues 1, . . . ,m, respectively. When
every Aj has cardinality exactly 2, i.e. when for every issue only a “yes” or “no”
vote is allowed, we say that we are in the binary (or the Boolean) framework.
Let X be a non-empty subset of
∏m
j=1 Aj that represents the feasible vot-
ing patterns. We write Xj , j = 1 . . . ,m, to denote the j-th projection of X .
From now on, we assume that each Xj has cardinality at least 2 (this is a
non-degeneracy condition). Throughout the rest of the paper, unless otherwise
declared, X will denote a set of feasible voting patterns on m issues, as we just
described.
Let n ≥ 2 be an integer representing the number of voters. The elements
of Xn can be viewed as n ×m matrices, whose rows correspond to voters and
whose columns correspond to issues. We write xij to denote the entry of the
matrix in row i and column j; clearly, it stands for the vote of voter i on issue j.
The row vectors of such matrices will be denoted as x1, . . . , xn, and the column
vectors as x1, . . . , xm.
Aggregators and Possibility Domains Let f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) be anm-tuple
of n-ary functions fj : A
n
j 7→ Aj .
An m-tuple of functions f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) as above is called supportive (con-
servative) if for all j = 1 . . .m, we have that
if xj = (x
1
j , . . . , x
n
j ) ∈ A
n
j , then fj(xj) = fj(x
1
j , . . . , x
n
j ) ∈ {x
1
j , . . . , x
n
j }.
An m-tuple f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) of (n-ary) functions as above is called an (n-
ary) aggregator for X if it is supportive and, for all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all
xj ∈ A
n
j , j = 1, . . . ,m, we have that
if (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn, then (f1(x1), . . . , fm(xm)) ∈ X.
Note that (x1, . . . , xn) is an n × m matrix with rows x1, . . . , xn and columns
x1, . . . , xm, whereas (f1(x1), . . . , fm(xm)) is a row vector required to be in X .
An aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) is called trivial (dictatorial) on X if there
is a number d ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that (f1, . . . fm) ↾ X = (pr
n
d , . . . , pr
n
d ) ↾ X , i.e.,
(f1, . . . fm) restricted to X is equal to (pr
n
d , . . . , pr
n
d ) restricted to X , where pr
n
d
is the n-ary projection on the d-th coordinate; otherwise, f¯ is called non-trivial
(non-dictatorial) on X . We say that X has a non-trivial aggregator if, for some
n ≥ 2, there is a non-trivial n-ary aggregator on X .
A set X of feasible voting patterns is called a possibility domain if it has a
non-trivial aggregator. Otherwise, it is called an impossibility domain. A possi-
bility domain is, by definition, one where aggregation is possible for societies of
some cardinality, namely, the arity of the non-dictatorial aggregator.
Aggregators do what their name indicates, that is, they aggregate positions
on m issues, j = 1, . . . ,m, from data representing the voting patterns of n
individuals on all issues. The fact that aggregators are defined as m-tuples of
functions Anj 7→ Aj , rather than a single function X
n 7→ X , reflects the fact
that the social vote is assumed to be extracted issue-by-issue, i.e., the aggregate
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vote on each issue does not depend on voting data on other issues. The fact that
aggregators are assumed to be supportive (conservative) reflects the restriction
of our model that the social vote for every issue should be equal to the vote cast
on this issue by at least one individual. Finally, the requirement of non-triviality
for aggregators reflects the fact that the aggregate vote should not be extracted
by adopting the vote of a single individual designated as a “dictator”.
Example 1. Suppose that X is a cartesian product X = Y × Z, where Y ⊆∏l
j=1 Aj and Z ⊆
∏m
j=l+1 Aj, with 1 ≤ l < m. It is easy to see that X is a
possibility domain.
Indeed, for every n ≥ 2, X has non-trivial n-ary aggregators of the form
(f1, . . . , fl, fl+1, . . . , fm), where for some d and d
′ with d 6= d′, we have that for
j = 1, . . . , l, fj = pr
n
d and for j = l + 1, . . . ,m, fj = pr
n
d′ . Thus, every cartesian
product of feasible patterns is a possibility domain. 
Now, following A´. Szendrei [15, p. 24], we define:
Definition 1. A ternary operation f : A3 7→ A on an arbitrary set A is a
majority operation if
f(x, x, y) = f(x, y, x) = f(y, x, x) = x, ∀x, y ∈ A,
and it is a minority operation if
f(x, x, y) = f(x, y, x) = f(y, x, x) = y, ∀x, y ∈ A.
We also define
Definition 2. A set of feasible voting patterns X as before admits a majority
aggregator if it admits a ternary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) such that for all
j = 1, . . . ,m, fj is a majority operation on Xj. X admits a minority aggregator
if it admits a ternary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) such that for all j = 1, . . . ,m,
fj is a minority operation on Xj.
Clearly X admits a majority aggregator iff there is a ternary aggregator
f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) for X such that, for all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all two-element
subsets Bj ⊆ Xj, we have that
fj↾ Bj = maj,
where
maj(x, y, z) =
{
x if x = y or x = z,
y if y = z.
Also X admits a minority aggregator if there is a ternary f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) for
X such that, for all j = 1, . . . ,m and for all two-element subsets Bj ⊆ Xj , we
have that
fj↾ Bj = ⊕,
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where
⊕(x, y, z) =


z if x = y,
x if y = z,
y if x = z.
Clearly as well, in the Boolean framework (for all issues only “yes” or “no”
votes are allowed) X admits a majority aggregator iff X as a logical relation (as
a subset of {0, 1}m) is bijunctive and X admits a minority aggregator iff X as
a logical relation is affine (see Schaefer [13]).
Example 2. The set
X = {(a, a, a), (b, b, b), (c, c, c), (a, b, b), (b, a, a), (a, a, c), (c, c, a)}
admits a majority aggregator.
To see this, let f¯ = (f, f, f), where f : {a, b, c} → {a, b, c} is as follows:
f(u, v, w) =
{
a if u, v, and w are pairwise different;
maj(u, v, w) otherwise.
Clearly, if B is a two-element subset of {a, b, c}, then f ↾ B = maj. So, to show
that X admits a majority aggregator, it remains to show that f¯ = (f, f, f) is an
aggregator forX . In turn, this amounts to showing that f¯ is supportive and that
X is closed under f . It is easy to check that f¯ is supportive. To show that X is
closed under f , let let x = (x1, x2, x3), y = (y1, y2, y3), z = (z1, z2, z3) be three
elements of X . We have to show that (f(x1, y1, z1), f(x2, y2, z2), f(x3, y3, z3))
is also in X . The only case that needs to be considered is when x, y, and z are
distinct. There are several subcases that need to be considered. For instance,
if x = (a, b, b), y = (a, a, c), z = (c, c, a), then (f(a, b, b), f(a, a, c), f(c, c, a)) =
(a, a, a) ∈ X ; the remaining combinations are left to the reader. 
Example 3. The set X = {(a, b, c), (b, a, a), (c, a, a)} admits a minority aggre-
gator.
To see this, let f¯ = (f, f, f), where f : {a, b, c} → {a, b, c} is as follows:
f(u, v, w) =
{
a if u, v, and w are pairwise different;
⊕(u, v, w) otherwise.
Clearly, if B is a two-element subset of {a, b, c}, then f ↾ B = ⊕. So, to show
that X admits a minority aggregator, it remains to show that f¯ = (f, f, f) is an
aggregator forX . In turn, this amounts to showing that f¯ is supportive and that
X is closed under f . It is easy to check that f¯ is supportive. To show that X is
closed under f , let let x = (x1, x2, x3), y = (y1, y2, y3), z = (z1, z2, z3) be three
elements of X . We have to show that (f(x1, y1, z1), f(x2, y2, z2), f(x3, y3, z3))
is also in X . The only case that needs to be considered is when x, y, and z are
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distinct, say, x = (a, b, c), y = (b, a, a), z = (c, a, a). In this case, we have that
(f(a, b, c), f(b, a, a), f(c, a, a)) = (a, b, c) ∈ X ; the remaining combinations are
similar. 
So far, we have given examples of possibility domains only. We close this
section with an example of an impossibility domain in the Boolean framework.
Example 4. Let set W = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)} be the set of all Boolean
tuples of length 3 in which exactly one 1 occurs. W is an impossibility domain.
Indeed, it can be seen that W is not affine and does not admit a binary
non-dictatorial aggregator. Therefore by Theorem 2 in the next subsection, W
is an impossibility domain. 
Note that, in the context of generalized satisfiability problems studied by
Schaefer [13], the set W gives rise to the NP-complete problem Positive 1-in-
3-Sat. On the other hand, as discussed earlier, the cartesian product W ×W is
a possibility domain. Using the results in [13], however, it can be verified that
the generalized satisfiability problem arising from W ×W is NP-complete. On
the other hand, e.g., {0, 1}m is trivially a possibility domain and gives rise to
a tractable satisfiability problem. Thus, the property of X being a possibility
domain is not related to the tractability of the generalized satisfiability problem
arising from X . Nevertheless in Section 5 we exhibit the equivalence between a
stronger, uniform, notion of X being a possibility domain and the weaker notion
of the tractability of the multi-sorted generalized satisfiability problem arising
from X , where each issue is taken as a sort. Actually, we prove this equivalence
not only for satisfiability but for CSP’s whose variables range over arbitrary
sets.
2.2 Summary of Results
Our first basic result is a necessary and sufficient condition for a set of feasible
voting patterns to be a possibility domain.
Theorem 1. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. Then the following
statements are equivalent.
1. X is a possibility domain.
2. X admits a majority aggregator or it admits a minority aggregator or it
has a non-trivial (non-dictatorial) binary aggregator.
Clearly, in Theorem 1, only the direction 1 =⇒ 2 requires proof. (proof is
given in Section 3)
An immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is the following result, which although
can also be immediately deduced from the combination of the work of Dokow
& Holzman on one hand and Szegedy & Xu on the other (see [7, Theorem 2]
and [14, Theorem 8]), was not previously explicitly mentioned.
Corollary 1. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. Then the following
statements are equivalent.
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1. X is a possibility domain.
2. X has a non-trivial (non-dictatorial) ternary aggregator.
Proof. Indeed a binary aggregator can also be considered as a ternary one, by
just ignoring one of its arguments.
Note that, Corollary 1, in contrast to Theorem 1, does not give informa-
tion about the nature of the components of the ternary aggregators entailed
when they are restricted to two-element sets of the corresponding set of votes, a
necessary information in order to relate results in aggregation theory with com-
plexity theoretic results (see Section 5). Observe however that for an arbitrary
(supportive) binary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm), every component fj , when re-
stricted to a two-element subset Bj ⊆ Xj considered as {0, 1}, is necessarily a
projection function or ∧ or ∨. So the information we mentioned before is given
gratis for binary aggregators.
Also implicit in Dokow and Holzman [8] is the following result about the
Boolean framework; we will provide an independent proof here (Section 3).
Theorem 2 (Dokow and Holzman). Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns
in the Boolean framework. Then the following statements are equivalent.
1. X is a possibility domain.
2. X is affine or X has a non-trivial (non-dictatorial) binary aggregator.
Note that Dokow and Holzman [8,9] as well as Szegedy and Xu [14] used the
concept of a totally blocked set of feasible voting patterns, a notion involving
the propagation of individuals’ positions, to characterize when such a set is an
impossibility domain (as mentioned earlier, the precise definition of this concept
will be given in Section 4).
We prove here that total-blockedness is simply a weak form of impossibility
domain restricted to binary aggregators:
Theorem 3. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. Then the following
statements are equivalent.
1. X is totally blocked.
2. X has no non-trivial (non-dictatorial) binary aggregator.
Theorem 3, which in some sense shows that the introduction of total blocked-
ness can be avoided, will be proved in Section 4.
Finally, in Section 5, we connect aggregation theory with complexity the-
ory. Towards this we introduce the following stronger notion of non-dictatorial
aggregator.
Definition 3. An aggregator of a set of feasible voting patterns X is called
uniformly non-dictatorial if for all j = 1, . . . ,m and every two-element subset
Bj ⊆ Xj, fj↾ Bj is not a projection function. X is called uniformly possibility
domain if it admits a uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity.
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Example 5. Let W be the 1-in-3 relation defined in Example 4. Then W ×W
is a possibility domain, which however is not a uniformly possibility domain in
the sense of Definition 3.
Indeed, since W is an impossibility domain, it easily follows that for every
n, all n-ary aggregators of W ×W are of the form
(prnd , pr
n
d , pr
n
d , pr
n
d′ , pr
n
d′ , pr
n
d′),
for d, d′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. 
Also, obviously, every X that admits a majority or a minority aggregator is
a uniformly possibility domain (upd).
Let now B be an arbitrary two-element set taken as {0, 1} and consider the
binary logical operations ∧ and ∨ on B (since we will always deal with both
these logical operations concurrently, it does not matter which element of B we
take as 0 and which as 1). For notational convenience we define two ternary
operations on B by:
∧(3)(x, y, z) = x ∧ y ∧ z and ∨(3) (x, y, z) = x ∨ y ∨ z.
In Section 5 we will prove:
Theorem 4. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. The following are
equivalent:
1. X is a uniformly possibility domain.
2. For every j = 1, . . . ,m and for every two-element subset Bj ⊆ Xj, there
is an aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) (depending on j and Bj) of some arity
such that fj↾ Bj is not a projection function.
3. There is ternary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) such that for all j = 1, . . . ,m
and all two-element subsets Bj ⊆ Xj, fj↾ Bj ∈ {∧
(3),∨(3),maj,⊕} (to
which of the four ternary operations ∧(3),∨(3),maj and ⊕ the restriction
fj↾ Bj is equal to depends on j and Bj).
4. There is ternary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) such that for all j = 1, . . . ,m
and all x, y ∈ Xj , fj(x, y, y) = fj(y, x, y) = fj(y, y, x).
See also the related result by Bulatov on “three basic operations” [3, Propo-
sition 3.1], [4, Proposition 2.2] (that result however entails only operations of
arity two or three). Some techniques of the proof of Theorem 4 had been used
in the aforementioned works by Bulatov (see Section 5).1
Corollary 2. Let X be a cartesian product X = Y × Z, where Y ⊆
∏l
j=1 Aj
and Z ⊆
∏m
j=l+1 Aj, with 1 ≤ l < m. Assume that Y, Z are upd’s. Then so is
X.
1This came to the attention of the authors only after the present work was essentially
completed.
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Proof. As a first case, let j = 1, . . . , l. Also let Bj ⊆ Xj be a two-element
set. Then there is an n-ary aggregator g¯ = (g1, . . . , gl) such that gj↾Bj is
not a projection. Define f¯ to be (g1, . . . , gl, pr
n
1 , . . . , pr
n
1 ), with m − l copies
of prn1 appended to g¯. Then, since j ≤ l, fj↾Bj = gj↾Bj is not a projection
function. Similarly in the case j = l + 1, . . . ,m. The result follows by item (2)
of Theorem 4.
To state our result that connects the property of X being a uniformly pos-
sibility domain with the property of tractability of a multi-sorted constraint
satisfaction problems, we first introduce some notions following closely [3, 5].
Again we consider a fixed set I = {1, , . . . ,m}, this time representing sorts,
and a family of finite sets A = {A1, . . . , Am}, each of cardinality at least 2,
representing the values the corresponding sorts can take. For any list of indices
(i1, . . . , ik) ∈ I (not necessarily distinct), a subset R of Ai1 ×· · ·×Aik , together
with the list (i1, . . . , ik), will be called a multi-sorted relation over A with arity
k and signature (i1, . . . , ik). For any such relation R, the signature of R will be
denoted σ(R). Any set of multi-sorted relations over A is called a multi-sorted
constraint language over A.
Definition 4 (Multi-sorted CSP). Let Γ be a multi-sorted constraint language
over a collection of sets A = (A1, . . . , Am). The multi-sorted constraint satis-
faction problem MCSP(Γ ) is defined to be the decision problem with instance
(V,A, δ, C), where V is a finite set of variables; δ is a mapping from V to I,
called the sort-assignment function (v belongs to the sort δ(v)); C is a set of con-
straints where each constraint C ∈ C is a pair (s,R), such that s = (v1, ..., vk) is
a tuple of variables of length k, called the constraint scope; R is an k-ary multi-
sorted relation over A with signature (δ(v1), ..., δ(vk)), called the constraint re-
lation. The question is whether there exists a value-assignment, i.e. a mapping
φ : V 7→
⋃m
i=1Ai, such that, for each variable v ∈ V, φ(v) ∈ Aδ(v), and for each
constraint (s,R) ∈ C, with s = (v1, ..., vk), the tuple (φ(v1), ..., φ(vk)) belongs to
R.
A multi-sorted constraint language Γ over A is said to be conservative if for
any A ∈ A and any B ⊆ A, B ∈ Γ (as a relation over A).
If X ⊆
∏m
j=1 Aj is a set of feasible voting patterns, X can be considered
as multi-sorted relation with signature (1, . . . ,m) (one sort for each issue). Let
Γ consX be the multi-sorted conservative constraint language comprised of X and
all subsets of all Aj , j = 1, . . . ,m, the latter considered as relations over Aj .
If all Aj are equal and |I| = 1, i.e. if there is no discrimination between
sorts, then MCSP(Γ ) is denoted just by CSP(Γ ). If the sets of votes for all
issues are equal, then it is possible to consider a feasible set of votes X as a one-
sorted relation (all issues are of the same sort). In this framework, and in case
all Aj are equal to {0, 1}, CSP(Γ
cons
X ) coincides with the problem Schaefer [13]
introduced and called the “generalized satisfiability problem with constants”, in
his notation SATC({X}) (the presence of the sets {0} and {1} in the constraint
language amounts to allowing constants, besides variables, in the constraints).
We will prove (Section 5) that:
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Theorem 5. If X is a uniformly possibility domain then MCSP(Γ consX ) is
tractable; otherwise it is NP-complete.
Theorem 5 is a corollary of Theorem 4 and Bulatov’s dichotomy theorem for
conservative multi-sorted constraint languages [3, Theorem 2.16]. For details
see Section 5.
Example 6. Let Y = {0, 1}3 \ {(1, 1, 0)} and let
Z = {(1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 0)}.
Then Y, Z and hence, by Corollary 2, X = Y × Z are upd’s, and therefore, by
Theorem 5, MCSP(Γ consX ) is tractable. However, the generalized satisfiability
problem with constants SATC({X}) (equivalently CSP(Γ
cons
X )) is NP-complete.
Indeed, in Schaefer’s [13] terminology, Y is Horn, equivalently co-ordinate-
wise closed under ∧, but is not dual Horn (equivalently not co-ordinate-wise
closed under ∨), nor affine (equivalently, does not admit a minority aggregator)
nor bijunctive (equivalently, does not admit a majority aggregator). Therefore,
by co-ordinate-wise closureness under ∧, Y is upd. Also, Z is affine, but not
Horn, nor dual Horn neither bijunctive. So, being affine, Z is upd. The NP-
completeness of SATC({X}) (equivalently, the NP-completeness of CSP(Γ
cons
X ))
follows from Schaefer’s archetypal dichotomy theorem [13], because X is not
Horn, dual Horn, affine, nor bijunctive.
The meta-problems Given a family A = {A1, . . . , Am} and a subset X ⊆∏m
j=1 Aj as input, adopting a terminology used in complexity theory, we call
meta-problems the questions of (i) whether X is a possibility domain and (ii)
whether X is a uniformly possibility domain.
Theorem 1, or even by Corollary 1, (respectively, Theorem 4) easily im-
plies that meta-problem (i) (respectively, meta-problem (ii)) is in NP. Indeed
we only have to guess suitable ternary or binary operations and check for clo-
sureness. However, even if the sizes of all Aj ’s are bounded by a constant (but
m, the number of issues/sorts, is unbounded), then the problems could be NP-
hard as there are exponentially large number of ternary or binary aggregators.
The question of exactly bounding this complexity is the object of ongoing re-
search. Of course, if besides the cardinality of all Aj , also their number m is
bounded, then Theorem 1, or even Corollary 1, (respectively, Theorem 4) im-
plies that meta-problem (i) (respectively, meta-problem (ii)) is tractable (for
the first meta-problem, this was essentially observed by Szegedy and Xu [14]).
3 Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
Before proving Theorem 1, we introduce and illustrate a new notion, and estab-
lish two lemmas.
Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns and let f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) be an
n-ary aggregator for X .
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Definition 5. We say that f¯ is locally monomorphic if for all indices i and j
with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, for all two-element subsets Bi ⊆ Xi and Bj ⊆ Xj, for every
bijection g : Bi 7→ Bj, and for all column vectors xi = (x
1
i , . . . , x
n
i ) ∈ B
n
i , we
have that
fj(g(x
1
i ), . . . , g(x
n
i )) = g(fi(x
1
i , . . . , x
n
i )).
Intuitively, the above definition says that, no matter how we identify the
two elements of Bi and Bj with 0 and 1, the restrictions fi↾ Bi and fj↾ Bj are
equal as functions.
Notice that in the definition we are allowed to have i = j, which implies that
if in a specific Bj we interchange the values 0 and 1 in the arguments of fj↾ Bj ,
then the bit that gives the image of fj↾ Bj is flipped.
It follows immediately from the definitions that if an aggregator is trivial
(dictatorial), then it is locally monomorphic. As we shall see next, different
types of examples of locally monomorphic aggregators arise in locally affine and
locally bijunctive sets of feasible voting patterns.
Example 7. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns that admits a ternary
aggregator f¯ = (f1, ..., fm) that is either a majority or a minority operation.
Then f¯ = (f1, ..., fm) is locally monomorphic.
Suppose that f¯ = (f1, ..., fm) is a minority operation, i.e. for every j with
1 ≤ j ≤ m and every two-element set Bj ⊆ Xj , we have that fj ↾Bj= ⊕. Let
i, j be such that 1 ≤ i, j,≤ m, let Bi = {a, b} ⊆ Xi, and let Bj = {c, d} ⊆ Xj
(we make no assumption for the relation, if any, between a, b, c, d). There are
exactly two bijections g and g′ from Bi to Bj, namely,
g(a) = c & g(b) = d
g′(a) = d & g′(b) = c
Suppose (x, y, z) is the i-th column vector of X3, with x, y, z ∈ Bi. Since
|Bi| = |Bj | = 2, it holds that fi ↾Bi= ⊕ = fj ↾Bj . Without loss of generality,
suppose x = a, y = z = b. Then
fj(g(x), g(y), g(z)) = fj(c, d, d)
= ⊕(c, d, d) = c
= g(a) = g(⊕(a, b, b))
= g(fj(x, y, z)).
An analogous statement holds for g′. Since i, j where arbitrary, we conclude
that f¯ is locally monomorphic.
The proof for the case when f¯ is a majority operation is similar. 
We now present the first lemma needed in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. If every binary aggregator
for X is trivial (dictatorial) on X, then, for every n ≥ 2, every n-ary aggregator
for X is locally monomorphic.
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Proof. Under the hypothesis that all binary aggregators are trivial, the conclu-
sion is obviously true for binary aggregators. By induction, suppose that the
conclusion is true for all (n − 1)-ary aggregators, where n ≥ 3. Consider an
n-ary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) and a pair (Bi, Bj) of two-element subsets
Bi ⊆ Xi and Bj ⊆ Xj . To render the notation less cumbersome, we will take
the liberty to denote the two elements of both Bi and Bj as 0 and 1. Assume
now, towards a contradiction, that there are a column-vector (a1, . . . , an) with
ai ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a “copy” of this vector belonging to Bni , another copy
belonging to Bnj , such that fi(a
1, . . . , an) 6= fj(a
1, . . . , an). Since n ≥ 3, by the
pigeonhole principle applied to two holes and at least three pigeons, there is
a pair of coordinates of (a1, . . . , an) that coincide. Without loss of generality,
assume that these two coordinates are the two last ones, i.e., an−1 = an. We
now define an (n − 1)-ary aggregator g¯ = (g1, . . . , gm) as follows: given n − 1
voting patterns (xi1, . . . , x
i
m), i = 1, . . . , n− 1, define n voting patterns by just
repeating the last one and then for all j = 1, . . . ,m, define
gj(x
1
j , . . . , x
n−1
j ) = fj(x
1
j , . . . , x
n−1
j , x
n−1
j ).
It is straightforward to verify that g¯ is an (n − 1)-ary aggregator on X that is
not locally monomorphic, which contradicts the inductive hypothesis.
Remark 1. The preceding argument generalizes to arbitrary cardinalities in
the following way: if every aggregator of arity at most s on X is trivial, then
every aggregator on X is s-locally monomorphic, meaning that for every k ≤ s
and for all sets Bj ⊆ Xj of cardinality k, the functions fj↾ Bj are all equal up
to bijections between the Bj’s.
We continue with a technical lemma whose proof was inspired by a proof in
Dokow and Holzman [9, Proposition 5].
Lemma 2. Assume that for all integers n ≥ 2 and for every n-ary aggregator
f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm), there is an integer d ≤ n such that for every integer j ≤ m
and every two-element subset Bj ⊆ Xj, the restriction fj↾ Bj is equal to pr
n
d ,
the n-ary projection on the d-th coordinate. Then for all integers n ≥ 2 and for
every n-ary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) and for all s ≥ 2, there is an integer
d ≤ n such that for every integer j ≤ m and every subset Bj ⊆ Xj of cardinality
at most s, the restriction fj↾ Bj is equal to pr
n
d .
Proof. The proof will be given by induction on s. The induction basis s = 2
is given by hypothesis. Before delving into the inductive step of the proof and
for the purpose of making the intuition behind it clearer, let us mention the
following fact whose proof is left to the reader. This fact illustrates the idea for
obtaining a non-trivial aggregator of lower arity from one of higher arity.
Fact. Let A be a set and let f : A3 7→ A be a supportive function such that
if among x1, x2, x3 at most two are different, then f(x1, x2, x3) = x1. Assume
also that there exist pairwise distinct a1, a2, a3 such that f(a1, a2, a3) = a2; in
the terminology of universal algebra, f is a semi-projection, but not a projection.
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Define g(x1, x2) = f(x1, f(x1, x2, a3), a3). Then, by distinguishing cases as to
the value of f(x1, x2, a3), it is easy to verify that g is supportive; however, g is
not a projection function because g(a1, a2) = a2, whereas g(a1, a3) = a1.
We continue with the inductive step of the proof of Lemma 2. Assume
that the claim holds for s − 1. We may assume that s ≤ n, lest the induction
hypothesis applies. Let f¯ be an n-ary aggregator for X and let d be the integer
obtained by applying the induction hypothesis on s − 1. Assume, without loss
of generality that d = 1. Then for every j ≤ m and for every subset Bj ⊆ Xj
of cardinality at most s − 1, we have that fj↾ Bj = pr
n
1 , the n-ary projection
function on d = 1. We will show that the same holds for subsets Bj ⊆ Xj of
cardinality at most s.
Assume towards a contradiction that there exists an integer j0 ≤ m and row
vectors a1, . . . , an in X such that the set Bj0 = {a
1
j0
, . . . , anj0} has cardinality s
and
fj0(a
1
j0
, . . . , anj0) 6= a
1
j0
. (1)
By supportiveness, there exists i0 ∈ {2, , . . . , n} such that
fj0(a
1
j0
, . . . , anj0) = a
i0
j0
. (2)
Let {k1, . . . , ks} be a subset of {1, . . . , n} of maximum cardinality such that the
ak1j0 , . . . , a
ks
j0
are pairwise distinct (the maximum such cardinality could not be
less than s because of the induction hypothesis). Obviously, if i 6∈ {k1, . . . , ks},
then there exists l ∈ {1, . . . , s} such that aij0 = a
kl
j0
. So, we may assume that the
i0 in equation (2) above belongs to {k1, . . . , ks} (and is different from 1, because
by equation (1), ai0j0 6= a
1
j0
). Since s ≥ 3 there is an element in {k1, . . . , ks}
different from both 1 and i0. Assume, without loss of generality, that this
element is ks. Let B
−
j0
= {ak1j0 , . . . , a
ks−1
j0
}. We define an (s− 1)-ary aggregator
f¯− = (f−1 , . . . , f
−
m) as follows:
f−j (x
1
j , . . . , x
s−1
j ) = fj(y
1
j , . . . , y
n
j ), j = 1, . . . ,m,
where,
yij =


xlj if i = kl for some l = 1, . . . , s− 1,
xlj if i 6∈ {k1, . . . , ks} and a
i
j0
= aklj0 for some l = 1, . . . , s− 1,
aksj if i = ks,
aksj if i 6∈ {k1, . . . , ks} and a
i
j0
= aksj0 .
(3)
Intuitively, to compute f−j (x
1
j , . . . , x
s−1
j ), we put x
1
j , . . . , x
s−1
j as arguments of
fj at the places {k
1, . . . , ks−1}, we put aksj as argument of fj at the place ks, and
finally, as arguments of fj at places not in {k
1, . . . , ks}, we put either a copy of
one {x1, . . . , xs−1} or a copy of aks following the pattern by which in the vector
a1j0 , . . . , a
n
j0
the coordinates ak1j0 , . . . , a
ks
j0
repeat themselves in the places not in
{k1, . . . , ks}.
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First observe that f¯− is supportive. Indeed this follows from the observation
that f−j can never take the value a
ks
j . Then observe that f¯
− = (f−1 , . . . , f
−
m) is
an aggregator on X , because all row vectors y1, . . . , yn defined above belong to
X (each is either some xi or some ai).
It is obvious that
f−j0 (a
k1
j0
, . . . , a
ks−1
j0
) = fj0(a
1
j0
, . . . , anj0) = a
i0
j0
.
Also, by the inductive hypothesis, if not all x1j0 , . . . , x
s−1
j0
are equal then
f−j0 (x
1
j0
, . . . , xs−1j0 ) = x
1
j0
.
Therefore, f−j0↾ B
−
j0
6= prs−11 , which is contradiction that concludes the proof of
Lemma 2.
Next, we bring into the picture some basic concepts and results from uni-
versal algebra; we refer the reader to Szendrei’s monograph [15]) for additional
information and background. A clone on a finite set A is a set C of finitary
operations on A (i.e., functions from a power of A to A) such that C contains
all projection functions and is closed under arbitrary compositions (superposi-
tions). The proof of the next lemma is straightforward, and we omit it.
Lemma 3. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. For every j with 1 ≤ j ≤
m and every subset Bj ⊆ Xj, the set CBj of the restrictions fj↾ Bj of the j-th
components of aggregators f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) for X is a clone on Bj.
Post [12] classified all clones on a two-element set (for more recent expositions
of Post’s pioneering results, see, e.g., [15] or [11]). One of Post’s main findings is
that if C is a clone of conservative functions on a two-element set, then either C
contains only projection functions or C contains one of the following operations:
the binary operation ∧, the binary operation ∨, the ternary operation ⊕, the
ternary operation maj.
We now restate Theorem 1 and prove it.
Theorem 1. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. Then the following
statements are equivalent.
1. X is a possibility domain.
2. X admits a majority aggregator or it admits a minority aggregator or it
has a non-trivial (non-dictatorial) binary aggregator.
Proof. As stated earlier, only the direction 1 =⇒ 2 requires proof. In the
contrapositive, we will only prove that if X does not admit a majority, neither
a minority, nor a non-trivial binary aggregator, then X does not have an n-ary
non-trivial aggregator for any n. Towards this goal, and assuming that X is
as stated, we will first show that the hypothesis of Lemma 2 holds. Then the
required follows from the conclusion of Lemma 2 by taking s = max{|Xj | : 1 ≤
j ≤ m}.
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Given j ≤ m and a two-element subset Bj ⊆ Xj , consider the clone CBj .
If CBj contained one of the the binary operations ∧ or ∨ then X would have a
binary non-trivial aggregator, a contradiction. If, on the other hand, CBj con-
tained the ternary operation ⊕ or the ternary operation maj, then, by Lemma 1,
X would admit a minority or a majority aggregator, a contradiction as well. So,
by the aforementioned Post’s result, all elements of CBj , no matter what their
arity is, are projection functions. By Lemma 1 again, since X has no binary
non-trivial aggregator, we have that for every n and for every n-ary aggregator
f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm), there exists an integer d ≤ n such that for every j ≤ m and
every two-element set Bj ⊆ Xj, the restriction fj↾ Bj is equal to pr
n
d , the n-ary
projection on the d-th coordinate. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
We conclude this section by restating Theorem 2 and proving it; as men-
tioned earlier, this result is implicit in [8]. Recall that in the Boolean framework,
X admits a majority (minority) aggregator iff a logical relation X is bijunctive
(affine). See Schaefer [13] for definitions.
Theorem 2 (Dokow and Holzman). Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns
in the Boolean framework. Then the following statements are equivalent.
1. X is a possibility domain.
2. X is affine or X has a non-trivial (non-dictatorial) binary aggregator.
Proof. Only the direction 1 =⇒ 2 requires proof. Assume that X is a possibility
domain in the Boolean framework. By Theorem 1, X admits either a majority
or a minority aggregator or X has non-trivial binary aggregator. Since we are
in the Boolean framework, this means that X is affine or X is bijunctive or X
has a non-trivial binary aggregator. If X has at most two elements, then X is
closed under ⊕, hence X is affine. So, it suffices to show that if X is bijunctive
and has at least three elements, then X has a non-trivial binary aggregator. In
turn, this follows immediately from the following claim.
Claim 1. Let X be a bijunctive relation on {0, 1} with at least three elements.
If X is not degenerate (i.e., every Xj has at least two elements), then X has a
binary non-monomorphic aggregator.
To prove Claim 1, fix an element a¯ = (a1, . . . , am) ∈ X . Define the following
binary aggregator, where x¯ = (x1, . . . , xm) and y¯ = (y1, . . . , ym) are arbitrary
elements of X :
f¯ a¯(x¯, y¯) = (maj(x1, y1, a1), . . . ,maj(xm, ym, am)).
First, observe that f¯ a¯ is indeed an aggregator for X . Since X is closed under
maj, all we have to prove is that f¯ a¯ is supportive. But this is obvious, because,
for j ≤ m, if xj = aj or yj = aj , then maj(xj , yj , aj) = xj or maj(xj , yj , aj) =
yj. If xj 6= aj and yj 6= aj , then xj = yj, hence maj(xj , yj , aj) = xj = yj.
Now assuming that X contains more than two elements and is not degen-
erate, we will show that there exists a row vector a¯ = (a1, . . . , am) ∈ X such
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that f¯ a¯ is not monomorphic, i.e., there are distinct i, j = 1, . . . ,m such that
f¯ a¯i 6= f¯
a¯
j , and thus the proof of the claim will be concluded.
Observe first that if for all distinct i ≤ m and j ≤ m one of the following
(depending on i, j) were true:
• for all vectors u¯ ∈ X , we have that ui = uj or
• for all vectors u¯ ∈ X , we have that ui 6= uj ,
then it would follow that there exist only two elements in X which at every
coordinate have complementary values, contradicting the hypothesis that X
contains more than two elements. Therefore, there exist two distinct integers
i ≤ m and j ≤ m for which there are two elements u¯, v¯ ∈ X such that ui 6= uj
and vi = vj . Combining the last statement with the non-degeneracy of X , we
conclude, by an easy case analysis, that there exist three elements u¯, v¯, w¯ ∈ X
such that at least one of the following four cases holds:
(i) the i-th and j-th coordinates of u¯, v¯, w¯ are (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), respectively,
(ii) the i-th and j-th coordinates of u¯, v¯, w¯ are (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0), respectively,
(iii) the i-th and j-th coordinates of u¯, v¯, w¯ are (1, 0), (1, 1), (0, 0), respectively,
(iv) the i-th and j-th coordinates of u¯, v¯, w¯ are (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0), respectively.
In cases (i) and (ii), by computing the i-th and j-th coordinates of f¯ u¯(u¯, v¯) and
f¯ u¯(v¯, u¯), we conclude that f¯ u¯i = ∨ and f¯
u¯
j = ∧, so f¯
u¯
i 6= f¯
u¯
j . In case (iii), by
computing the i-th and j-th coordinates of f¯ u¯(v¯, w¯), we conclude that f¯ u¯i 6= f¯
u¯
j .
Case (iv) is similar. This completes the proof of Claim 1 and of Theorem 2.
4 Total Blockedness
In this section, we will follow more closely the notation in [9]. Let X be a set
of feasible voting patterns.
Given subsets Bj ⊆ Xj, j = 1, . . . ,m, the product B =
∏m
j=1 Bj is called a
sub-box. It is called a 2-sub-box if |Bj | = 2 for all j.
Elements of a box B that belong also to X will be called feasible evaluations
within B (in the sense that each issue j = 1, . . . ,m is “evaluated” within B).
If K ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, a vector x ∈
∏
j∈K Bj is called a partial feasible evaluation
within B if there exists a feasible y ∈ B that extends x, i.e. xj = yj , ∀j ∈ K,
whereas x is called an infeasible within B partial evaluation otherwise; finally, x
is called a B-Minimal Infeasible Partial Evaluation (B-MIPE) if x is a infeasible
within B partial evaluation and if for every j ∈ K, there is a bj ∈ Bj so that
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changing the j-th coordinate of x to bj results in a feasible partial evaluation
within B.
We define a directed graph GX whose vertices correspond to all pairs of
distinct elements u, u′ in Xj for all j = 1, . . .m and are to be denoted by uu
′
j.
Given two vertices uu′k, vv
′
l with k 6= l, we connect them by a directed edge from
uu′j towards vv
′
l if there exists a 2-sub-box B =
∏m
j=1 Bj, a K ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} and
a B-MIPE x = (xj)j∈K so that k, l ∈ K and Bk = {u, u
′} and Bl = {v, v
′} and
xk = u and xl = v
′. We denote such a directed edge by uu′k −→
B,x,K
vv′l (or just
uu′k → vv
′
l in case B, x,K are understood from the context).
We say thatX is totally blocked ifGX is strongly connected, i.e., for every two
distinct vertices uu′k, vv
′
l are connected by a directed path (this must hold even
if k = l). This definition, given by Dokow and Holzman [9], is a generalization to
the case where Aj are allowed to have arbitrary cardinalities of a corresponding
definition for the Boolean framework (all Aj of cardinality 2), originally given
in [10].
The length of a B-MIPE x = (xj)j∈K is |K|. We say that X is multiply
constrained (definition by Dokow and Holzman [9]) if there exists a sub-box B
for which there exists a B-MIPE of length at least 3.
Dokow and Holzman [9] have established the following two results.
Theorem A (Dokow and Holzman [9]). If X is totally blocked and multiply
constrained then X is an impossibility domain.
Theorem B (Dokow and Holzman [9]). If X is not totally blocked, then X
is a possibility domain; in fact for every n ≥ 2 there is a non-trivial n-ary
aggregator.
Quite recently, Szegedy and Xu [14] provided a sufficient and necessary con-
dition for X to be an impossibility domain. Their result is as follows.
Theorem C (Szegedy and Xu [14]). If X is totally blocked then X is an impos-
sibility domain if and only if X contains no binary and no ternary non-trivial
aggregator.
Observe that latter two theorems obviously imply Corollary 1, however this
was not previously explicitly stated.
We now prove that:
Theorem 3. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. Then the following
statements are equivalent.
1. X is totally blocked.
2. X has no non-trivial (non-dictatorial) binary aggregator.
Direction 2 =⇒ 1 is contained in Dokow and Holzman [9, Theorem 2] (Theo-
rem B above); for completeness, we give an independent proof of both directions.
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Proof. We start with direction 1 =⇒ 2. Consider at first two vertices uu′k, vv
′
l
of GX (with k 6= l) connected by an edge uu
′
k → vv
′
l. Then there exists a
2-sub-box B =
∏m
j=1 Bj with Bk = {u, u
′} and Bl = {v, v
′} and a B-MIPE
x = (xj)j∈K such that {k, l} ⊆ K and xk = u, xl = v
′.
Claim 2. For every binary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) of X, if fk(u, u
′) = u
then fl(v, v
′) = v.
Proof of Claim. By the minimality of x within B if we flip xk from u to u
′ or if
we flip xl from v
′ to v, then we get, in both cases, respective feasible evaluations
within B. Therefore, there are two total evaluations e and e′ in X∩B such that
• ek = u
′ and
• es = xs for s ∈ K, s 6= k (in particular el = v
′),
because we get a feasible evaluation within B by flipping xk from u to u
′ and
• e′l = v and
• e′s = xs for s ∈ K, s 6= l (in particular e
′
k = u).
This is so because we get a feasible evaluation within B by flipping xl from v
′
to v.
If we assume, towards a contradiction, that fk(u, u¯) = u and fl(v, v¯) = v¯,
we immediately have that the evaluation
f¯(e, e′) := (f1(e1, e
′
1), . . . , fm(em, e
′
m))
extends (xj)j∈K , contradicting the latter’s infeasibility within B. This com-
pletes the proof of Claim 2. 
From Claim 2, we get that if uk →→ vl and fk(u, u¯) = u, then fl(v, v¯) =
v (even if k = l). From this, it immediately follows that if GX is strongly
connected, then every binary aggregator of X is dictatorial.
We will now prove Direction 2 =⇒ 1 of Theorem 3 , namely, that if X
is not totally blocked, then there is a non-trivial binary aggregator (this part
is contained in [9, Theorem 2] –Theorem B above). Since GX is not strongly
connected, there is a partition of the vertices of GX into two mutually disjoint
and non-empty subsets V1 and V2 so that there is no edge from a vertex of V1
towards a vertex in V2. We now define a f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm), where fk : A
2
k 7→ Ak,
as follows:
fk(u, u
′) =


u if u, u′ ∈ Xk and uu
′
k ∈ V1 and u 6= u
′,
u′ if u, u′ ∈ Xk and if uu
′
k ∈ V2 and u 6= u
′,
u if u = u′ or u ∈ Ak \Xk or u
′ ∈ Ak \Xk.
(4)
In other words, for two differing values u and u′ in Xk, the function fk is defined
as the projection on the first coordinate if uu′k ∈ V1, and as the projection onto
the second coordinate if uu′k ∈ V2; we also define fk(u, u) = u if u = u
′ or if
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either u or u′ is not in Xk (i.e., when at least one of them is not a projection
onto the k-th coordinate of an element of X , in this latter case the value of
fk(u, u
′) can be arbitrarily defined, as it has no effect on the properties of f¯).
Notice that f¯ is non-trivial, because V1 and V2 are not empty.
All that remains to be shown is that X is closed under f¯ , i.e., if e =
(e1, . . . , em), e
′ = (e′1, . . . , e
′
m) ∈ X are two total feasible evaluations, then
f¯(e, e′) := (f1(e1, e
′
1), . . . fm(em, e
′
m)) ∈ X. (5)
Let
L = {j = 1, . . . ,m | ej 6= e
′
j}.
For an arbitrary j ∈ L, define vertexj(e, e
′) to be the vertex uu′j of GX , where
u = ej and u
′ = e′j .
If now f¯(e, e′) = e or if f¯(e, e′) = e′, then obviously (5) is satisfied. So
assume that
f¯(e, e′) 6= e and f¯(e, e′) 6= e′. (6)
Also, towards showing (5) by contradiction, assume
f¯(e, e′) 6∈ X. (7)
Define now a 2-sub-box B = (Bj)j=1,...,m as follows:
Bj =
{
{ej, e
′
j} if ej 6= e
′
j ,
{ej, aj} otherwise ,
(8)
where aj is an arbitrary element 6= ej of Xj (the latter choice is only made to
ensure that |Bj | = 2 in all cases).
Because of (7) and (8), we have that f¯(e, e′) is a total evaluation infeasible
within B. Towards constructing a B-MIPE, delete one after the other (and
as far as it can go) coordinates of f¯(e, e′), while taking care not to destroy
infeasibility within B. Let K ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} be the subset of coordinate indices
that remain at the end of this process. Then the partial evaluation
x :=
(
fj(ej , e
′
j)
)
j∈K
(9)
is infeasible within B. Therefore, lest e or e′ extends x =
(
fj(ej , e
′
j)
)
j∈K
(not
permissible because the latter partial evaluation is infeasible), there exist k, l ∈
K such that
ek 6= e
′
k and el 6= e
′
l (10)
and also
fk(ek, e
′
k) = ek and fl(el, e
′
l) = e
′
l. (11)
But then if we set
u = ek, u
′ = e′k, v = el, v
′ = e′l, (12)
we have, by (4), (10), (11) and (12), that
vertexk(e, e
′) = uu′k ∈ V1 and vertexl(e, e
′) = vv′l ∈ V2 (13)
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and, by (4), (11) and (12), we get that
uu′k −→
B,x,K
vv′l
which by (13) is a contradiction, because we get an edge from V1 to V2. This
completes the proof of Theorem 3.
5 Uniformly Possibility Domains
We start with the following lemma:
Lemma 4 (Superposition of aggregators). Let f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) be an n-ary
aggregator and let
h1 = (h11, . . . , h
1
m), . . . , h
n = (hn1 , . . . , h
n
m)
be n k-ary aggregators (all on m issues). Then the m-tuple of k-ary functions
(g1, . . . , gm) defined by:
gj(x1, . . . , xk) = fj(h
1
j(x1, . . . , xk), . . . , h
n
j (x1, . . . , xk)), j = 1, . . . ,m
is also an aggregator.
Proof. Let xlj , l = 1, . . . , k, j = 1, . . . ,m be a k ×m matrix whose rows are in
X . Since the hi, i = 1, . . . , n are k-ary aggregators, we conclude that for all
i = 1, . . . , n,
(hi1(x
1
1, . . . , x
k
1), . . . , h
i
m(x
1
m, . . . , x
k
m)) ∈ X.
We now apply the aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) to the n×m matrix
hij(x
1
j , . . . , x
k
j ), i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m,
which concludes the proof.
Using the above lemma we will assume below, often tacitly, that various
tuples of functions obtained by superposition of aggregators with other aggre-
gators, like projections, are aggregators as well.
We now prove three lemmas:
Lemma 5. Let A be an arbitrary set and f : A3 7→ A a ternary supportive
operation on A, and B a two-element subset of A taken as {0, 1}. Then f↾B is
commutative iff f↾B ∈ {∧(3),∨(3),maj,⊕}.
Proof. Only the sufficiency of commutativity of f↾B for its being one of ∧(3),∨(3),
maj,⊕ is not absolutely trivial. Since f is supportive, f(0, 0, 0) = 0 and
f(1, 1, 1) = 1. Assume f↾{0, 1} is commutative. Let
f(1, 0, 0) = f(0, 1, 0) = f(0, 0, 1) := a, and
f(0, 1, 1) = f(1, 0, 1) = f(1, 1, 0) := b.
By supportiveness, a, b ∈ {0, 1}. If a = b = 0, then f = ∧(3); if a = b = 1,
f = ∨(3); if a = 0 and b = 1, f = maj; and if a = 1 and b = 0, f = ⊕.
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Lemma 6. Let A be an arbitrary set and f, g : A3 7→ A two ternary supportive
operations on A. Define the supportive as well ternary operation
h(x, y, z) = f(g(x, y, z), g(y, z, x), g(z, x, y)).
If B is a two-element subset of A then h↾B is commutative if either f↾B or g↾B
is commutative.
Proof. The result is absolutely trivial if g↾B is commutative, since in this case,
by supportiveness of f , h↾B = g↾B. If on the other hand f↾B is commutative
then easily from the definition of h follows that for any x, y, z ∈ B, h(x, y, z) =
h(y, z, x) = h(z, x, y). This form of superposition of f and g appears also in
Bulatov [4, Section 4.3].
For notational convenience, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 6. Let f¯ and g¯ be two aggregators on X. Let f¯ ⋄ g¯ be the ternary
aggregator h¯ = (h1, . . . , hm) defined by:
hj(x, y, z) = fj(gj(x, y, z), gj(y, z, x), gj(z, x, y)), j = 1, . . . ,m,
(The fact that h¯ is indeed an aggregator follows from Lemma 4 and the fact that
a tuple of functions comprised of the same projections is an aggregator.)
Lemma 7. Let f¯ and g¯ be two aggregators on X. Let i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} two
arbitrary issues (perhaps identical) and Bi, Bj two two-element subsets of Xi
and Xj, respectively. If fi↾Bi and gj↾Bj are commutative (i.e. by Lemma 5
if each is one of the ∧(3),∨(3), maj,⊕) then both f¯ ⋄ g¯↾Bi and f¯ ⋄ g¯↾Bj are
commutative (i.e. each is one of the ∧(3),∨(3), maj,⊕).
Proof. Immediate by Lemmas 5 and 6.
We now restate and prove the characterization of uniformly possibility do-
mains:
Theorem 4. Let X be a set of feasible voting patterns. The following are
equivalent:
1. X is a uniformly possibility domain.
2. For every j = 1, . . . ,m and for every two-element subset Bj ⊆ Xj, there
is an aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) (depending on j and Bj) of some arity
such that fj↾ Bj is not a projection function.
3. There is ternary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) such that for all j = 1, . . . ,m
and all two-element subsets Bj ⊆ Xj, fj↾ Bj ∈ {∧
(3),∨(3),maj,⊕} (to
which of the four ternary operations ∧(3),∨(3),maj and ⊕ the restriction
fj↾ Bj is equal to depends on j and Bj).
4. There is ternary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) such that for all j = 1, . . . ,m
and all x, y ∈ Xj , fj(x, y, y) = fj(y, x, y) = fj(y, y, x).
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Proof. The directions (1) =⇒ (2) and (3) =⇒ (1) are obvious. Also the
equivalence of (3) and (4) immediately follows from Lemma 5. It remains to
show (2) =⇒ (3). For a two-element subset Bj ⊆ Xj , let CBj be the clone
(Lemma 3) of the restrictions fj↾ Bj of the j-th components of aggregators
f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm). By Post [12], we can easily get that CBj contains one of the
operations ∧,∨,maj and ⊕. Therefore, easily, for all j, Bj there is a ternary
aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) (depending on j, Bj) such that fj↾Bj is one of the
∧(3),∨(3),maj and ⊕. Now let f¯1, . . . , f¯N be an arbitrary enumeration of all
ternary aggregators each of which on some issue j and some two-element Bj is
one of the ∧(3),∨(3),maj and ⊕ and such that the f¯ l’s cover all possibilities for
j, Bj . As a ternary operation h¯ such that uniformly for each j, Bj , the restriction
hj↾Bj belongs to the set {∧
(3),∨(3),maj,⊕} we can take, by Lemma 7,
(· · · (f¯1 ⋄ f¯2) ⋄ · · · ⋄ f¯N),
which concludes the proof.
Now Bulatov’s dichotomy theorem [3, Theorem 2.16] in our setting reads:
Dichotomy Theorem (Bulatov). If for any j = 1, . . . ,m and any two-element
subset Bj ⊆ Xj there is either a binary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) such that
f¯j↾Bj ∈ {∧,∨} or a ternary aggregator f¯ = (f1, . . . , fm) such that f¯j↾Bj ∈
{maj,⊕}, then MCSP(Γ consX ) is tractable; otherwise it is NP-complete.
We finally restate and prove Theorem 5:
Theorem 5. If X is a uniformly possibility domain then MCSP(Γ consX ) is
tractable; otherwise it is NP-complete.
Proof. The tractability part of the statement follows from Bulatov’s Dichotomy
Theorem and item (3) of Theorem 4 (observing that x ∧ y = ∧(3)(x, x, y) and
similarly for ∨ and using Lemma 4), whereas the completeness part follows from
Bulatov’s Dichotomy Theorem and item (2) of Theorem 4.
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